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TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
STEPHEN M. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") discov-
ered an outbreak of a life-threatening disease, the spread of which
could be significantly limited through publicity regarding the
manner in which the disease is transmitted, but the CDC withheld
information about the outbreak because it was concerned that
publicity regarding the outbreak could lead to widespread panic
and economic dislocation. Alternatively, imagine that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") or the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") learned that the in-
halation of certain chemicals caused severe and acute health
problems, but the agencies withheld information regarding which
companies used those chemicals because they feared that terrorists
would discover the location of the chemicals and obtain them for
use as weapons. In light of the response of the federal and state
governments to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
neither of these scenarios seems as far-fetched as they might have
in the past.
Almost two centuries ago, James Madison declared that
"Ikinowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives."' However, since September 11,
federal and state governments have significantly reduced public
access to environmental, health, and safety information because
they fear such information could be used by terrorists to harm
citizens of the United States.2 These post-September 11 actions
* Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, L.L.M. George Washington
University School of Law.
1 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE
MADISON: HIS BASIc WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
2 See OMB Watch, Access to Government Information Post September 11th, at
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seem to portend an anti-democratic trend toward greater govern-
ment control of environmental, health, and safety information.
For a decade or more prior to September 11, federal and state
governments increasingly addressed environmental problems
through market-based programs, instead of traditional command
and control programs.' Information disclosure was an important
tool for the government.' The legislature enacted or amended
several environmental laws requiring disclosure of health and
safety information.' The public, empowered with that information,
could then use green consumerism, green investing, negotiation,
and lobbying to encourage businesses to reduce activities that
presented environmental, health, or safety risks.6 However, the
http://www.ombwatch.orglarticle/articleview/213/1il (lastvisited Sept. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Access to Government Information] (outlining the information
removed from government Web sites).
3 For example, EPA's Clean Air Markets Division works towards better air
quality through the use of market-based regulatory programs. U.S. Envt'l Prot.
Agency, Clean Air Markets, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ about.
html (last updated Sept. 23, 2004). See also Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v.
Equity: Do Market Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental
Justice? 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 113-14 (1999) (stating that "major types
of market-based approaches that have been implemented over the past decade
are pollutant trading programs, pollution taxes and subsidies, deposit-refund
systems, and regulator waiver or variance programs, such as EPA's Brownfield
Project XL or Brownfields Action Agenda") (citations omitted). OMB Watch and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation Web sites identify government Web sites
that have been removed since September 11. See Access to Government
Information, supra note 2.
4 For example, the Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI"), to which facilities report
chemicals used and released, allows the public to use the information as
leverage to stop or reduce pollution. Adoption of Reporting Elements, Toxic
Chemical Release Reporting, Community Right to Know Act ("ECPRA"), 61 Fed.
Reg. 51, 322 (proposed Oct. 1, 1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11003 (2000)).
' See, e.g., The Emergency Planning & Community Right to Know Act of 1986,
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994) (requiring manufacturing facilities to provide
information on use of regulated chemicals released or used to EPA and states);
Id. § 11023; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(g)-3(c) revising the Safe Drinking Water
Act ("SDWA") to require water suppliers to give information about effects of
contaminants in water.
6 U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, 2002 Toxics Release Inventory Public Data Release,
at http://www.epa.gov/tri (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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measures implemented by the federal and state governments in
response to September 11 have been a throw-back to the 1970s.
Not only have governments significantly reduced disclosure of
environmental, health, and safety information, but they have also
relied primarily on command and control requirements to reduce
security risks to companies that engage in activities that could
harm the environment, health, or safety.7 This circling of the
wagons ignores the lessons learned in environmental regulation
over the past decade.
Instead of reducing disclosure of environmental, health, and
safety information, governments should expand planning and
information disclosure requirements for businesses that engage in
activities that could potentially harm the environment, health, and
safety. Instead of relying on command and control requirements to
harden targets, governments should use September 11 as the
impetus for a renewed focus on pollution prevention and toxics use
reduction.
Part I of this Article examines the post-September 11 trend of
reduced access to environmental, health, and safety information.
Part II introduces the tools that governments might use to protect
the environment while protecting homeland security, including
planning and information disclosure, command and control
measures, and pollution prevention measures. Part II also
criticizes the reliance on command and control measures as the
primary means of addressing the security issues created by
businesses that engage in activities that could harm the environ-
ment, health, or safety. Part III explores the advantages of
planning and information disclosure programs over command and
control programs as a means of reducing environmental, health,
and safety risks posed by businesses while recognizing security
concerns. Finally, Part IV reviews the benefits of pollution
prevention and toxics use reduction programs and suggests
improvements to existing programs.
7 See infra notes 24-40, 81-89, and accompanying text.
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I. REDUCED ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY
INFORMATION
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, federal and
state governments have taken numerous steps to reduce public
access to environmental, health, and safety information.' Govern-
ments have removed information from the Internet, narrowed their
interpretation of freedom of information laws, and enacted new
laws or reinterpreted administrative regulations to limit disclo-
sure of information.9
Almost immediately after the September 11 attacks, govern-
ment agencies began removing from their Web sites environmen-
tal, health, or safety information they believed could, if disclosed,
increase risks to public safety. 10 EPA, which had been a leader in
using the Internet as a public involvement tool, removed emer-
gency planning information for chemical facilities under the
agency's risk management program."The agency also reduced the
public's ability to search its Envirofacts database, which contains
information about pollution and environmental compliance for
industrial facilities regulated by the agency. 2 The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission removed a map of nuclear reactors from
8 See generally Access to Government Information, supra note 2; Chemical
Security Act of 2003, S. 152, 108th Cong. (2003); Wastewater Treatment Works
Security and Safety Act, S. 779, 108th Cong. (2003); Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-481. See
also Penn Internet & American Life Project, One Year Later: September 11 and
the Internet, 8-12, Sept. 5, 2002, at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP
9-11_Report.pdf.
9 See infra notes 10-77 and accompanying text.
10 See Joseph A. Siegel, Terrorism and Environmental Law: Chemical Facility
Site Security vs. Right-to-Know?, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 339 (2003); Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Chilling Effects of Anti-Terrorism, at http://www.eff.org/
Privacy/Surveillance//Terrorismlantiterrorism-chill.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2004); Access to Government Information, supra note 2.
"l See Siegel, supra note 10, at 339.
12U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Envirofacts Data Warehouse, at http://www.epa.gov/
enviro/index java.html (last updated June 30, 2004). See John D. Echeverria &
Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural 'Reform": In Defense of Environmental
Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLy 579, 597-98 (2003).
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its Web site and temporarily "disabled its entire Web site to
prevent review of all material" on the site. 3 "The U.S. Department
of Transportation removed pipeline mapping information from
its Web site .... New Jersey and Pennsylvania, among other
states, removed information from their Web sites regarding the
health and environmental effects of chemicals.' 5
Shortly after government agencies began purging Web sites of
environmental, health, and safety information, the federal
government took a more drastic step to limit public access to
information when Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a
memorandum encouraging agencies to be less liberal in disclosing
information under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").16 The
Attorney General's memorandum indicated that, although the
Administration recognized the important goals of FOIA, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Bush administration were
"equally committed to protecting other fundamental values that
are held by our society[,] ... [including] safeguarding our national
security... [and] protecting sensitive business information....""
Accordingly, the Attorney General's memorandum counseled
agencies to "carefully consider" the exemptions from disclosure
when deciding whether to release information requested under
FOIA.'8 The memorandum stressed that "[any discretionary
decision.., to disclose information.., should be made only after
full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial,
and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by
disclosure of the information." 9 It further stated that if agencies
decided to withhold records, DOJ would defend the decision
"unless [the agencies] lack[ed] a sound legal basis ....
13 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 340 (footnote omitted).
14 Id. at 339-40.
15 See Access to Government Information, supra note 2.
16 See Memorandum from John Ashcroft to the Heads of All Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
04foia/011012.htm.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 29:107
One year after the Attorney General issued his FOIA
memorandum, the White House placed further limits on agencies'
discretion in releasing information under FOIA when, at the
request of Andrew Card, the President's Chief of Staff, the
Information Security Oversight Office and DOJ's Office of Infor-
mation and Privacy issued a memorandum to agencies regarding
classified information and sensitive, but unclassified, infor-
mation.2' The memorandum noted that "agencies maintain and
control sensitive information related to America's homeland
security that might not meet one or more of the standards for
classification" as classified information under FOIA and that "[tihe
need to protect such sensitive information from inappropriate
disclosure should be carefully considered . ,,." The memoran-
dum stressed that "in taking necessary and appropriate actions to
safeguard sensitive but unclassified information related to Amer-
ica's homeland security," federal agencies should process requests
for information "in accordance with the Attorney General's FOIA
Memorandum of October 12, 2001, by giving full and careful
consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions."23
Congress also took a strong step toward limiting public access
to information when it enacted the Critical Infrastructure Informa-
tion Act of 2002 ("CIIA"), which created a new FOIA exemption for
critical infrastructure information. 24 The law requires the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security ("DHS") "M[to carry out comprehensive
assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States" to terrorist attacks, and to
prepare a plan to protect those resources and infrastructure from
21 See Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Director, Information
Security Oversight Office, and Richard L. Huff & Daniel J. Metcalfe, Co-
Directors, Office of Information and Privacy, DOJ, to Departments and Agencies
(March 21, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002
foiapostlO.htm.22 Id.
2 3 Id.
24 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§§211-15, 116 Stat. 2150 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §122 (Supp. 2003)). DHS
promulgated regulations to implement the Act on April 15, 2003. See 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,523 (Apr. 15, 2003).
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attacks.25 Critical infrastructure includes power production,
generation, and distribution systems, information technology and
telecommunications systems, and similar resources.26 In order to
facilitate collection of the information needed by the government
to conduct assessments and create emergency plans, the law
provides that "critical infrastructure information (including the
identity of the submitting person or entity) that is voluntarily27
submitted to a covered Federal agency for use by that agency
regarding the security of critical infrastructure" is exempt from
disclosure under FOIA.2' The law also provides that critical
infrastructure information that is voluntarily submitted cannot be
used in any civil action arising under federal or state law, cannot
be shared with other federal agencies except for the purposes of
CIIA, and cannot be disclosed by state agencies under state
disclosure laws if the information is provided to them.29 Further,
the law creates criminal sanctions for the disclosure by federal
employees of voluntarily submitted critical infrastructure informa-
tion.3 °
Supporters of the legislation may argue that CIIA does not
significantly limit public access to environmental, health, and
safety information because it only protects critical infrastructure
information that is voluntarily submitted. 3' However, "critical
infrastructure information" is defined broadly to include "any
planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical
infrastructure . . . including repair, recovery, reconstruction,
insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such
25 6 U.S.C.A. § 121 (Supp. 2004).
26 Id. The President or Secretary of Homeland Security may designate programs
as critical infrastructure protection programs. Id. § 132.
21 "Voluntary" submission means the submission "in the absence of [an] agency's
exercise of legal authority to compel access to or submission of such
information." 6 U.S.C.A. § 131(7)(A) (Supp. 2004).
2 Id. § 133(a)(1).
29 Id.
30 Id. § 133(f).
31 See generally National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of
2002, Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. RPT. No. 107-175, CIS No. 2 CIS
S403-9 (June 24, 2002), for the portion of legislative history recommending
passage.
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interference, compromise, or incapacitation."3 2 If a utility thus
submitted information to DHS regarding past operational prob-
lems, repairs, or reconstruction at electricity generating facilities,
that information would be exempt from disclosure under FOIA and
state FOIAs.33 To the extent the information identified a past
violation of federal or state environmental laws, it could not be
used in a civil enforcement action. In addition, federal employees
who discovered violations of environmental laws through the
voluntary submissions would face criminal fines and imprisonment
if they disclosed those violations to federal or state environmental
regulators .
The 107th Congress enacted another law that requires
submission of health and safety information, but prohibits pub-
lic disclosure of that information. The Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
("PHSBPRA) 35 amended SDWA to require that drinking water
providers review: their "water collection, pretreatment,
treatment, storage and distribution facilities,... and other...
systems,.., the use, storage or handling of various chemicals [in
32 6 U.S.C.A. § 131(3) (Supp. 2004).
33 5 U.S.C. §522(b) (listing the exemptions).
" Citizens and interest groups concerned with government accountability and
public access to information have sharply criticized CIIA. See OMB Watch,
Restore FOIA Bill: An Important Step in Fixing the Homeland Security Act, at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1378/1/73/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2004). Several Senators have introduced the Restoration of Freedom of
Information Act of 2003 to amend the information disclosure provisions of the
law. See S. 609, 108th Cong. (2003). A companion bill has also been introduced
in the House. See Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2003, H.R. 2526,
108th Cong. (2003). The proposed revisions would clarify that CIIA does not
protect information that is disclosed under it if the government could have
required the submission of the information. Id. They would also clarify that the
law only protects information submitted to DHS, and would allow federal
agencies that receive voluntarily submitted information to share that
information with other federal agencies. See id. The proposed revisions would
also eliminate the civil immunity provisions of CIIA, the criminal penalty
provisions that apply to federal employees, including whistleblowers, and the
preemption of state and local disclosure laws. Id.
15 Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
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their systems], and the operation and maintenance of such
system [s]" to determine their vulnerability to intentional acts that
could significantly harm public health. 6 While drinking-water
providers must prepare emergency response plans to address risks
identified in the vulnerability assessments,37 the assessments, and
any information derived from the assessments, are exempt from
disclosure under FOIA and must not be provided to state or local
officials unless EPA deems it appropriate." Federal employees who
disclose the assessments to persons other than those designated by
the Administrator of EPA can be fined or imprisoned under the
law.3 9
State legislatures are following the federal government's lead
by enacting legislation to limit disclosure of environmental,
health, and safety information when disclosure of such information
could present security risks. For instance, at least twenty-seven
states have enacted legislation to limit disclosure of vulnerability
assessments prepared by drinking water suppliers under
PHSBPRA.
40
While federal and state governments have reduced public
access to environmental, health, and safety information in the
wake of the September 11 attacks, regulated industries had
consistently pressed for such reductions prior to September 11.
41
However, these pre-September 11 requests for limits on public
access to information were not motivated primarily by security
concerns. When businesses sought to limit disclosure of toxic
release inventory data, under the EPCRA, pollution prevention
plans under state laws, or information regarding environmental
"violations discovered through environmental audits,"42 their
36 42 U.S.C.A. § 300i-2(a) (2003).
37 Id. § 300i-2(b).
3 1 Id. § 300i-2(a).
39 Id.
40 See Majority of States Amending Disclosure Laws to Protect Security-Related
Data at Facilities, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2128 (Sept. 26, 2003).
41 See generally Access to Government Information, supra note 2.
42 Steven A. Herman, Statement Before the Environment and Public Works Co-
mmittee (Oct. 30,1997), available at http://epw.senate.gov/105th/epal0-30htm.
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motivations were primarily economic.43 Not only did businesses
seek to limit disclosure of confidential business information and
trade secrets, but they also sought to limit disclosure of informa-
tion that might portray them as environmentally insensitive or
that could subject them to citizen or government lawsuits.44
41 Cynical observers might speculate that while regulated industries lobby for
reductions in information disclosure based on security concerns, the true
motivation for seeking reduced information disclosure continues to be economic.
"See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (2004). Businesses are not alone in taking advantage of hei-
ghtened security concerns to lobby for legislative and administrative changes
that they previously sought under other guises. Subsequent to the events of
September 11, the U.S. military has lobbied strongly for exemptions from
environmental laws on the grounds that such exemptions are necessary to
facilitate training during this period of heightened security. On March 6, 2003,
the Pentagon announced a Readiness and Range Preservation initiative, in
which it sought to exempt military training activities from several provisions of
the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), Superfund, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. See
Linda Roeder, Bush Administration to Clarify Proposal Allowing Military
Environmental Exemptions, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 760 (Apr. 4, 2003); Linda
Roeder, Defense Department Proposal Jeopardizes Environmental Laws, House
Democrats Say, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 761 (Apr. 4, 2003). Most of the proposed
changes concerned waste disposal because the Defense Department sought to
"remove 'explosives, unexploded ordinance, [and] munitions'" from RCRA's
definition of "solid waste" and to limit the government's authority to require the
military to clean up pollution caused by those materials under RCRA or
Superfund. Id. at 762. While Congress did not adopt the broad exemptions
sought by the Defense Department, it did adopt more modest measures. See
House, Senate OK Defense Authorization Bill Containing Endangered Species
Act Changes, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1236 (May 20, 2003). For instance, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 prohibits the federal
government from designating critical habitat for endangered species on military
lands that have adopted Integrated Resources Management Plans for managing
fish and wildlife habitats. Id. At the same time the Pentagon announced its
Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, reminding them"that nine environmental laws authorize the president
to exempt military training activities if he determines such action is in the
'paramount interest of the United States' or necessary for 'reasons of national
security'" and urging the Secretaries "to abandon their 'past restraint' in
pursuing national security exemptions 'in cases where environmental
requirements threaten [the] continued ability to properly train and equip the
116
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Professor Daniel C. Esty notes that businesses are often reluctant
to disclose information because they see themselves in an ad-
versarial relationship with regulators, they may think their
information is a strategic asset and source of competitive advan-
tage, and they fear litigation that could result from disclosure of
the information.4 5
Prior to September 11, EPA's Risk Management Program
("RMP") under the Clean Air Act was the only environmental
information disclosure program for which security was raised as a
significant concern. Section 112 of the Act requires owners and
operators of facilities that produce, process, handle, or store
hazardous substances that are covered by the Act to prepare RMPs
that assess the potential effects of an accidental substance
release.46 EPA's regulations require RMPs to include an Offsite
Consequences Analysis ("OCA") that examines the impacts of a
release on the surrounding community, including an analysis of
the "worst case scenario."47 As part of OCA, facilities are required
to describe the location of hazardous substances at the facility, the
zone around the facility that would be affected by a release of those
substances, and the number of residents, schools, and day care
centers that would potentially be affected within the zone.48 When
EPA issued regulations in 1996 to implement RMP, information
disclosure was a central part of the regulations. 49 EPA developed
men and women of the Armed Forces." Mike Ferullo, Pentagon Memo Orders
Service Chiefs to Seek Environmental Exemption Cases, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
714 (Mar. 28, 2003).
45 See Esty, supra note 44, at 207.
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(1) (2003).
47 See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,668 (June
20, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 68.165).
48 Id.
4' The agency indicated
that information about hazards in a community can and should
lead public officials and the general public to work with industry
to prevent accidents.... EPA intends that officials and the
public use this information to understand the chemical hazards
in the community and then engage in a dialogue with industry
to reduce risk.
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. at 31,670.
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an electronic reporting system for RMP information" and an-
nounced plans to make the information publicly available through
the Internet."' FBI and other law enforcement officials criticized
EPA's plan to electronically publicize the information, citing
national security concerns.52 Congress reacted to those concerns by
passing the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security, and
Fuels Regulatory Relief Act ("CSISSFRRA"),53 which imposed a
one-year moratorium on public access to any OCA information
through the Internet or FOIA and required that the government
promulgate regulations allowing public access to the information
only after a cost-benefit analysis of disclosure.5 4 Within a year of
Congress' enactment of CSISSFRRA,55 EPA and DOJ promulgated
regulations to implement the law.56 The rules severely limit public
access to OCA information by providing that most OCA informa-
tion will not be posted on the Internet,57 and by requiring citizens
50Id.
511d. at 31,695.
52 Distribution of Offsite Consequence Analysis Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,834,
24,835 (Apr. 27, 2000).
53 Pub. L. No. 106-40, 113 Stat. 207 (1999).
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(7)(H) (2003).
5' The law provided that the bar on releasing information under FOIA would
expire within a year if EPA and DOJ did not issue regulations providing for
access to information within that time. Id. Because the government issued the
regulations within a year, the bar on releasing OCA information under FOIA
remains in effect.
56 See Distribution of Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information: Final Rule,
65 Fed. Reg. 48,108, 48,126 (Aug. 4, 2000).
17 The rule explicitly prohibits the posting of any of the following OCA
information on the Internet: the names of chemicals addressed in the OCA, a
description of the "worst-case scenario" or "the alternative release scenarios," the
quantities of chemicals that would be released in a worst-case scenario or
alternative scenario, the chemical release rates for the worst-case and
alternative release scenarios, the "duration of the chemical release in the
alternative release scenario," the distance to release endpoints, the "endpoint
used for flammables for the alternative release scenario," the "residential popu-
lation within the distance to endpoint," the "public receptors within the distance
to endpoint," the "environmental receptors within the distance to end-point," and
"[a]ny map or other graphic used to illustrate a scenario." Id. at 48,128.
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to review most OCA material in agency reading rooms where the
material may not be photocopied.5"
Prior to CSISSFRRA and other post-September 11 measures
described above, government limits on access to environmental,
health, and safety information were modest. Other than the
exemptions to disclosure in FOIA,59 the major limits imposed on
access to environmental information were the trade secret and
confidential business information limits imposed by many
of the federal environmental laws.6" Historically, those limits
have not been absolute, and disclosure has been allowed when
58 Id. at 48,127. In order to use reading rooms, persons must present a
government-issued photo identification and sign in. A person may review up to
ten OCAs per month for any facility in the country and can review an unlimited
number of OCAs for facilities in their community. Id. For the first few years
after the regulations were implemented, there were only thirty-three visits to
reading rooms to access OCA information, and almost all of those visits were in
Washington, D.C. See Jeff Johnson, The Vanishing Risk Management Plan,
CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Feb. 25, 2002, at 27.
The final rules also established a "vulnerable zone indicator system." 65
Fed. Reg. 48,108, 48,127. The system allows persons, by e-mail, phone or mail,
"to learn whether a specific address (such as that of a home, school, or place of
employment) falls within a reported 'vulnerable zone' (i.e., within any RMP
facility's worst-case or alternative release scenario's 'distance to endpoint')" of
an accidental release. Id.
" FOIA exempts the following information from disclosure: classified
information pursuant to criteria in Executive Orders, information "related solely
to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency," information
"specifically exempted ... by statute," "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or confidential," "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency," "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," "records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes" (if certain criteria are met), certain
information regarding "regulation or supervision of financial institutions," and
"geological and geophysicalinformation and data...." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
60 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§136-136h (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2613(c)
(2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50, 11042 (2000).
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non-disclosure creates significant risks to human health or the
environment.6 '
The precautionary approach toward terrorism that has
motivated the federal government's post-September 11 limits
on information disclosure contrasts sharply with its consistent
rejection of the "Precautionary Principle" in domestic and
international environmental matters.62 The reduced access to
environmental, health, and safety information is, however,
61 The Toxic Substances Control Act authorizes the government to disclose trade
secrets "if the Administrator determines it necessary to protect health or the
environment against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment." 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(3). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act also authorizes the release of certain trade secrets or
confidential information if "necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment." 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d). EPCRA also allows
the government to disclose some trade secrets or confidential information when
necessary to inform the public about the adverse health effects of a chemical
regulated under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 11042.
The limited protection afforded to trade secrets and confidential
information by the environmental laws is consistent with the protection afforded
to trade secrets by common law. See Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 611.
Trade secret laws are designed to prevent unjust enrichment and competitive
harm from the disclosure of trade secrets, and not to prevent public access to
information when disclosure of the information is necessary to protect health or
the environment. Id. at 612-13. While trade secrets may be property that is
protected by the Constitution, courts have upheld federal disclosure of such
information when necessary to protect health or the environment so long as the
government compensates the property owner for the harm caused by the
disclosure of the information. Id.
62 The United States and Europe have frequently clashed in recent years over
the importance of a precautionary approach toward environmental and health
matters, including the regulation of genetically modified food, climate change,
and hormones in beef. The European Union has incorporated the "Precautionary
Principle" into many of its environmental laws and frequently advocates
incorporation of the Principle into international environmental treaties. See
Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Com-
parison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
207, 210-13 (2003). The United States has relied more heavily on risk
assessment and cost-benefit analysis than on the Precautionary Principle in
environmental decision-making, but it has taken a precautionary approach
toward terrorism and other risks. Id. at 239-41.
120
2004] TERRORISM, SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 121
consistent with a more general pattern of information control
within the Executive Branch over the past few years. For instance,
EPA has been criticized for removing, allegedly for political
reasons, portions of a report that acknowledged the human impact
on and environmental consequences of global warming.63 This was
just one of the actions discussed in a February, 2004 report of the
Union of Concerned Scientists which suggested that scientific
findings are routinely being suppressed, distorted, and manipu-
lated by the Executive Branch for political reasons.64 EPA was also
recently criticized for potentially violating federal law by using an
advertising campaign targeting Hispanic voters to win support for
the Bush administration's Clear Skies Initiative.5 The Executive
Branch's attempts to limit public access to information have also
spurred Supreme Court litigation. The Sierra Club and Judicial
Watch challenged Vice President Richard Cheney's failure to
63 See Andrew C. Revkin & Katherine Q. Seelye, Report by E.P.A. Leaves Out
Data on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al. In the spring of
2003, EPA prepared a draft report, obtained by the New York Times, on the
state of the environment, which included a discussion of global warming. Id.
After the document was reviewed by the White House, EPA was asked to remove
from the report references to a 2001 National Research Council study, which
suggested that smokestack and tailpipe emissions have contributed to global
warming problems. Id. EPA was also asked to remove a study that suggested
that global temperatures have increased sharply in the past decade compared
to levels over the previous 1,000 years. Id. When the agency was asked to
replace those references with references to a study that was financed, in part,
by the American Petroleum Institute, which also raised skepticism regarding the
causes for, or extent of, global warming, EPA removed the entire global warming
discussion from the report. Id. See also NBC Nightly News: White House Censors
Global Warming Report (NBC television broadcast, June 19, 2003).
64 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking,
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www2.ucsusa.org/global-environment/rsi/page.
cfm?pageID=1322.
6 See Steve Cook, House Democrats Question EPA Use of Ads to Boost Hispanic
Support for 'Clear Skies'. 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2280 (Oct. 17, 2003). Critics
argued that EPA's ad campaign violated provisions of the agency's
appropriations law, which bans the use of agency funds for "propaganda
purposes," and that it also violated a federal law prohibiting federal officials
from engaging in campaigns about pending legislative matters. Id. (quoting a
letter written by Reps. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), John Dingell (D-Mich.), and
David Obey (D-Wisc.) to Marianne Horinko, Acting EPA Administrator).
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disclose information regarding meetings that he had with several
energy company representatives, allegedly in violation of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, in order to develop a White
House energy policy.66
Unfortunately for advocates of open government and public
access to information, the events of the past few years have
reversed, or at least substantially slowed, a trend that was
growing toward greater openness, increased public participation,
increased information disclosure, and increased use of the Internet
in federal and state government decision-making generally, and in
environmental decision-making specifically. In 1996, Congress
enacted the Electronic Freedom of Information Act ("E-FOIA") to
encourage agencies to use the Internet and new technologies to
collect and disseminate information and to protect and expand
public access to information collected through those new technolo-
gies.67 E-FOIA explicitly requires agencies to make an index of
frequently requested records available to the public in electronic
66 See In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded by
124 U.S. 2576 (2004). The Sierra Club and Judicial Watch filed lawsuits against
the Vice President, alleging that he violated the Federal Advisory Committee
Act when he held several meetings with energy company representatives to
develop the energy policy for the Bush administration in early 2000. Id. During
discovery, the plaintiffs asked the Vice President to provide documents that
identified the persons with whom he met when formulating the Administration's
energy policy and the substance of his conversations with those persons. Id.
When the Vice President refused to produce non-privileged documents and a
privilege log, the district court ordered him to produce those documents. Id. He
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Id.
67 The amendments were enacted to "foster democracy by ensuring public access
to agency records and information ... improve public access to agency records
and information" and "maximize the usefulness of agency records and inform-
ation collected, maintained, used, retained, and disseminated by the Federal
Government." Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-231, § 2(b), 110 Stat. 3048, 3048-49 (1996). In the findings for the
amendments, Congress stated that "Iglovernment agencies should use new
technology to enhance public access to agency records and information."Id. §
2(a)(6). TheAct amends the FOIA definition of "record" to clarify that electronic
data are "records." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2000). It also requires agencies to
provide records to citizens who request them in electronic format if the records
are readily reproducible in that format. Id. § 552(a)(3)(B).
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format,6" to make records created after November 1, 1996 available
by computer or electronic means if those records must be made
available to the public under FOIA,69 and to make annual reports
regarding FOIA compliance accessible by computer.7" E-FOIA is
just one of several measures instituted in the past decade designed
to encourage agencies to increase public access to information
through the use of new technologies. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, 7' which
created a Chief Information Officer in each executive agency in
order to "promot [e] the effective and efficient design and operation
of all major information resources management processes for the
executive agency .... ,72 Also in 1996, President Clinton issued an
Executive Order on Federal Information Technology that estab-
lished the Government Information Technology Services Board to
ensure that agencies utilize new technologies to improve access to
public information and improve public participation in government
decision-making.73 The movement toward greater public access to
government information through technology was consistent with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, which requires agencies to
"ensure that the public has timely and equitable access to the
agency's public information, including ensuring such access
through.., encouraging a diversity of public and private sources
for information based on government public information.., and
agency dissemination of public information in an efficient,
effective, and economical manner."74
Before the recent purge, EPA was a leader among federal
agencies in making information accessible to the public through
the Internet. The agency posted most of its major policies and
guidance documents on its Web site and provided citizens with
numerous tools to access and map environmental quality data
"8 Id. § 552(a)(2)(E) (2000).
69 Id. § 552(a)(2).
70 Id. § 552(e)(2).
71 Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 679 (1996).
72 Id. § 5125(b)(3).
73 Exec. Order No. 13,011, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,657 (July 16, 1996).
74 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d)(1) (2000).
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about their communities. 75 Although EPA and the federal govern-
ment have continued to expand access to some information and
increase participation in environmental decision-making through
technology 7 and other means, 77 legislatures and other agencies
" See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Alphabetical List of Databases and Software, at
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/abcdata.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). Some of
the more popular tools include TRI Explorer, which provides access to Toxic
Release Inventory Data, at http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2004), and Surf Your Watershed, which allows citizens to obtain information
about the water quality of, and pollution sources in, their watershed, at
http://www.epa.gov/enviro/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
76 EPA's enforcement and compliance database ("ECHO"), launched in November
2002, handled over one million search requests in its first year. See Database of
Environmental Records Handled 1 Million Searches in First Year, 34 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 2604 (Nov. 28, 2003). In 2003, EPA also provided public access to a
database of over 4,000 scientific studies and research that the agency relies upon
in decision-making. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Science Inventory, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). More generally, on January
23, 2003, the federal government launched a Web site, http://www.
regulations.gov, which allows citizens to access all rulemakings that are open for
public comment, and to provide comments on those rules. The Web site is part
of a federal "eRulemaking" initiative, which also includes the creation of a single
government-wide electronic docket for rulemaking. See Patricia Ware, Federal
Government Launches Internet Site To Allow Greater Participation in
Rulemaking, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 261 (Jan. 31, 2003).
77 In June 2003, EPA amended its public involvement policy to involve the public
in environmental decision-making at an earlier stage in the process, and to inc-
rease opportunities for public involvement. See 68 Fed. Reg. 33,946 (June 6,
2003). The policy identifies the following seven basic steps for effective public
involvement:
1. Plan and budget for public involvement activities.
2. Identify the interested and affected public.
3. Consider providing technical or financial assistance to the
public to facilitate involvement.
4. Provide information and outreach to the public.
5. Conduct public consultation and involvement activities.
6. Review and use input, and provide feedback to the public.
7. Evaluate public involvement activities.
Id. The policy applies to all EPA activities, but is only a policy and not a
regulation. As such, it "is not legally enforceable, and does not confer legal rights
or impose legal obligations upon any member of the public, EPA or any other
agency. Resource constraints, the need for timely action and other
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continue to limit access to any information, the disclosure of which
might raise security concerns.
Ironically, the movement in the United States to limit access
to information based on security concerns has coincided with an
international trend toward increased access to information and
public participation in government decision-making. In the past
decade, twenty-six countries have enacted laws that guarantee
public access to government information.78 In Japan, citizens filed
more than 4,000 requests for information within the first week
that the country's Freedom of Information law became effective.79
The movement has been bolstered in part by the United Nations'
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice ("Aarhus Convention"),
which came into effect in October, 2001.0 Incidentally, the United
States is not a signatory to the Aarhus Convention.
II. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND
POLLUTION PREVENTION: TOOLS To PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
WHILE PROTECTING PUBLIC SAFETY
The terrorist attacks of September 11 have profoundly
impacted many aspects of our daily lives. In the wake of those
events, the federal and state governments could have taken
a variety of approaches to address security concerns in environ-
mental protection programs. The federal and state governments
have returned to command and control programs in the wake of
September 11, despite moving away from such programs over the
past decade. The laws that have been enacted and the programs
that have been implemented since September 11 take a command
considerations may affect the appropriate nature and extent of public
involvement." Id. at 33,948.
7 See Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POLY, July/Aug.
2002, at 50.
79 Id.
8°UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, Introducing the
AARHUS Convention, at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2004). A protocol of that treaty has also facilitated the adoption by
many countries of Pollution Release and Transfer Registers, such as the United
States' Toxic Release Inventory. See Wiener, supra note 62, at 244-45.
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and control approach and focus primarily on increasing security
requirements for critical infrastructure and businesses that could
be targets of terrorist attacks, including businesses that store,
produce, or use hazardous chemicals."' The laws and programs
often provide funding for hardening those potential targets of
terrorism. 2 As environmental agencies have increased their focus
on preventing terrorism, they have also reduced enforcement of the
requirements of traditional environmental laws that do not focus
on potential terrorist activity. 3 At the same time, many of the new
laws have delegated regulatory authority to DHS, rather than
environmental agencies, to set security, health, and safety stan-
dards.8 4 More importantly, however, the laws and programs
8' See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text for a description of these laws
and programs. The laws generally delegate authority for implementing the
enhanced security requirements to DHS, rather than EPA.
12 PHSBPRA authorized the appropriation of $160 million to be used by drinking
water systems for security enhancements including:
A) the purchase and installation of equipment for detection of
intruders; (B) the purchase and installation of fencing, gating,
lighting, or security cameras; (C) the tamper-proofing of
manhole covers, fire hydrants, and valve boxes; (D) the rekeying
of doors and locks; (E) improvements to electronic, computer,
or other automated systems and remote security systems; (F)
participation in training programs, and the purchase of training
manuals and guidance materials, relating to security against
terrorist attacks; (G) improvements in the use, storage, or
handling of various chemicals; and (H) security screening of
employees or contractor support services.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300i-2(e) (2003).
83 See Mike Ferullo & Steve Cook, Environmental Group's Survey of EPA Staff
Says Priority Has Shifted to Security Needs, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1012 (May 2,
2003). Several EPA enforcement agents were transferred to work on security
and terrorism cases and were detailed to other agencies to work on such
cases after September 11. Id. See also Mike Ferullo, EPA Looks to Improve
Criminal Program After Completing Management Review, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
2764 (Dec. 19, 2003). Even though EPA is recalling many of the agents to focus
on traditional environmental violations, DOJ continues to target enforcement
actions against persons whose violations of the environmental laws imperil the
nation's critical infrastructure. See Bruce Passfield, Remarks at American Bar
Association Section on Environment, Energy and Resources Teleconference on
Homeland Security and Environmental Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2004).
84 The Transportation Security Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,510 (March 25,
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adopted since September 11 frequently limit public access to
information about the environmental and health risks posed by
businesses that are potential targets of terrorism and by facilities
that are part of the nation's critical infrastructure. Limited access
is the result of fear that the facilities are more likely to be attacked
if terrorists are made aware of their potential health and environ-
mental impacts.85 Congress adopted this command and control
model with limited information access in laws that address risks
caused by harm to critical infrastructure and drinking water
systems. It appears poised, through the proposed Chemical
Facilities Security Act ("CFSA") of 2003,6 to adopt the same
model to address risks caused by harm to chemical plants. The
proposed legislation requires owners and operators of chemical
plants to create vulnerability assessments and security plans, but
limits public access to those plans. 7 While federal and state
governments traditionally took the command and control approach
when addressing environmental problems, alternative approaches
2003), and the Maritime Security Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,448 (Oct. 22,
2003), which were recently issued by the Department of Homeland Security,
have been criticized by the regulated community as vague, expensive, and
confusing. See Mary Ellen Ternes, Remarks at American Bar Association
Section on Environment, Energy and Resources Teleconference on Homeland
Security and Environmental Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2004). Presidential
Directive/Hspd-7 provides that the Department of Homeland Security is the lead
agency to ensure protection of most of the country's critical infrastructure,
including chemical facilities. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
Hspd-7 (Dec. 17, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/
20031217-5.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). There are a few exceptions to the
Department's authority. The Directive delegates to the Energy Department the
primary responsibility for energy infrastructure and delegates to EPA the
primary responsibility for drinking water and wastewater systems. Id.
8 5 See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
86 S. 994, 108th Cong. (2003).
87 Id. The proposal also exempts from FOIA the disclosure of any information
that the proposal requires businesses to prepare or collect. Id. The proposal gives
DHS, rather than EPA, primary authority for reviewing the plans and enforcing
the law. Id. While the proposed legislation requires businesses to prepare plans,
it does not require them to submit them to DHS unless the Department requests
the plans. Id. Although the proposal includes penalty provisions, it does not
include a citizen suit provision. Id.
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have proven to be more effective in addressing a variety of
environmental problems in recent years. Information disclosure
and planning laws and programs have played a vital role in
environmental protection over the past decade, and governments
should be increasing, rather than decreasing, the use of those tools
in environmental programs in light of security concerns."8 While
some of the measures adopted to address security concerns after
September 11 have included planning requirements, the new
programs are fundamentally different from the successful
environmental planning laws of the past because they are not
transparent and are only reviewed, if at all, by the government.8 9
The public thus plays a limited role in the planning process. In
addition to increasing information disclosure and planning
requirements in environmental programs, governments should
seize this opportunity to invigorate and expand pollution preven-
tion and toxics use programs that will reduce or eliminate the
environmental and health hazards posed by chemical facilities,
instead of attempting to control the risks after they have been
created.
There are several fundamental flaws related to the adoption
of a command and control model addressing the environmental,
health, and safety risks posed by terrorist activities. Not surpris-
ingly, most of the flaws are those that exist generally for command
and control programs. First, the mandatory security measures
required by the new laws and programs can be very expensive for
businesses.' ° In many cases, businesses may be able to achieve the
Other market-based tools, such as tax incentives for security equipment, could
also be used to reduce the environmental, health, and safety risks caused by
harm to chemical plants. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 378.
89 Both CIIA and PHSBPRA require the preparation of emergency plans, but
limit public participation in development of and access to those plans. See supra
notes 16-29 and accompanying text. Similarly, CSISSFRRA requires DOJ to
develop information on the vulnerability of chemical facilities to terrorist and
criminal activity and to make recommendations to Congress for reducing that
vulnerability. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(H)(xi) (2000). DOJ submitted an interim
report to Congress, but the report was not made available to the public because
of security concerns. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 371.
90 See James T. O'Reilly, Planning for the Unthinkable: Environmental Disaster
Planning Issues in an Age of Terroristic Threats, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 261,275
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same reduction in risk, at a lower cost, by changing their processes
to eliminate the use, production, or storage of chemicals that could
be the target of terrorist acts.91 The high cost of compliance with
mandatory security measures could reduce the domestic and inter-
national competitiveness of businesses.92 Second, to the extent that
new laws and programs impose uniform security requirements,
those requirements may be inefficient because they could require
businesses to implement more stringent controls than are neces-
sary, based on their unique risks.93 Third, there are limits to the
effectiveness of imposing mandatory security measures to harden
targets of terrorism. For instance, even the most extreme security
measures might not prevent destruction of bridges or other
components of critical infrastructure.9 4 In light of those flaws,
governments should more closely scrutinize planning, information
disclosure, and pollution prevention requirements to reduce
environmental, health, and safety risks posed by potential terrorist
acts.
III. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
Perhaps most importantly, the events of September 11 demon-
strated the value and necessity of emergency planning programs
and information disclosure. While modern environmental law
primarily focuses on preventing long-term harm to the environ-
ment and human health, sudden disasters, whether natural or
man-made, can cause much greater harm to the environment and
health than the incremental damage regulated by most environ-
mental laws.95 During the twentieth century, the number of
persons killed in industrial accidents far exceeded the number of
(2003).
9 1 Id.
92 Professor O'Reilly suggests that legislation should be enacted to provide
financial assistance to businesses to comply with the new mandatory security
requirements. Id. Without such assistance, he speculates that many businesses
will move overseas or cease operations. Id. at 274-75.93 Id. at 275.
94 Id. at 265.
9 See Michael B. Gerrard, Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After
September 11, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 223, 232-33 (2003).
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persons killed by exposure to hazardous substances regulated
under Superfund. 6 Emergency planning is an important part of
EPCRA,9 7 the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),98 the
Clean Air Act," and other environmental statutes. However, there
are no emergency planning requirements for wastewater treat-
ment facilities and other facilities which could cause harm to the
environment or health if attacked by terrorists. 10 ' Thus, planning
provisions in environmental law should be expanded, and planners
must carefully consider a wider range of potential risks and harms.
Not only must they prepare plans to address the worst-case
scenarios of risk and harm, but also all other realistic alternative
scenarios.' 01 Professor Daniel A. Farber describes the importance
of planning for catastrophic events in his recent work on complex-
ity theory and power laws.0 2 Farber notes that many environmen-
tal issues involve complex systems that are often characterized by
a statistical distribution called a "power law," rather than a bell
96 Id. at 224. More than 1,000 persons were killed in just four industrial
accidents in the United States during the twentieth century. Id.
9 42 U.S.C. § 11003 (2000).
98 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
99 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000).
1
' See Guide for Small Wastewater Systems Published by West Virginia
University, 34 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2198 (Oct. 3, 2003). In order to assist small
wastewater treatment plants in assessing their vulnerabilities to natural
disasters, vandalism, operator error, and terrorism, EPA provided the
University of West Virginia with funding to prepare an assessment and plan-
ning guide for wastewater plants serving fewer than 10,000 people. Id.
Congress is also considering legislation that would require, and provide
funding for, wastewater treatment plants to conduct vulnerability assess-
ments. Id.
101 One way to address some of the limitations of current environmental law
would be to expand the scope of the emergency planning requirements of
EPCRA. Although the Act does not explicitly require planners to consider worst
case scenarios and other realistic alternative scenarios of risk and harm, the law
requires them to plan emergency responses to releases of hazardous substances.
See 42 U.S.C. § 11003 (2000).
102 See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
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curve, the normal distribution.10 3 Farber describes the difference
between a bell curve and a power law in the following manner:
Even people who have never heard of a bell curve...
have an intuitive sense of its properties, with most
events bunched near the average and extreme out-
comes fading away quickly. If the average cat weighs
ten pounds, we can expect that most cats will be
within a few pounds of the average and we can safely
disregard the possibility of a two hundred pound
tabby.... If feline weight were subject to a power
law, we would find that the vast majority of cats were
tiny or even microscopic but that one-thousand-pound
house cats would cross our paths now and then.1 4
The risk of terrorist activity is similarly subject to a power
law. As Farber notes, when the government designs a system to
stop airline passengers at a security checkpoint, "the large majo-
rity of travelers will cause no harm at all while a tiny number of
terrorists will cause disastrous outcomes." 105 For systems that
are subject to a power law, it is important to predict and plan for
extremely unlikely, but potentially tragic, events. As Farber
explains, "it is reasonably foreseeable that non-reasonably fore-
seeable events will occur from time to time. A planning process
that ignores this reality will work satisfactorily nearly all of the
time but when failures occur they may be catastrophic."0 6 RMP
requires worst-case scenario planning, and NEPA was originally
interpreted to require agencies to prepare a worst-case scenario
analysis as part of an environmental impact statement.'0 7 Now,
however, the Council for Environmental Quality's regulations only
require agencies to consider "reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse effects on the human environment. .. ""' After Septem-
103 Id. at 149-50.
'o
4 Id. at 146-47.
105 Id. at 162.
106 Id. at 146.
107 See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
108 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2003). The regulations define "reasonably
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ber 11, planning under the environmental laws must be expanded.
Before activities that could significantly harm human health and
the environment are authorized under those laws, the persons who
plan to pursue those activities should predict and plan for a range
of worst-case and alternative scenarios of harm to health or the
environment, explicitly considering the potential for terrorist
actions.
In order for emergency planning to be effective, it must be in-
clusive.'1 9 Federal, state, and local officials must work together to
coordinate their responses in the event of emergencies. 110 The
public should play a vital role in emergency planning. If planners
do not seek public input in preparing and reviewing emergency
response plans, they run the risk of relying on inaccurate assump-
tions that easily could have been corrected through public com-
ment. In addition, emergency plans can only be implemented
effectively if the public knows that the plans exist and under-
stands its responsibilities under the plans."' Ideally, planners will
periodically test the effectiveness of the plan with emergency
simulations and drills.
The planning provisions of the post-September 11 laws do
not envision an inclusive planning process. On the contrary,
PHSBPRA does not require vulnerability assessments or emer-
gency response plans to be provided to state or local officials or
the public." 2 The proposed CFSA similarly would not require
foreseeable" to include impacts "which have catastrophic consequences, even if
their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts
is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and
is within the rule of reason." Id. § 1502.22(b)(4). The Supreme Court has held
that the new regulation does not require agencies to prepare worst-case
scenarios as part of an environmental impact statement. See Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
109 Prior to the explosion of a BASF chemical plant in Cincinnati, Ohio, the
community formed a ninety-two-member emergency planning committee under
EPCRA. See O'Reilly, supra note 90, at 262-63. The committee included
emergency professionals, environmental groups, and the general public, and its
planning saved many lives by giving an early alert to firefighters. Id.
110 Id. at 263-64.
111 Id. at 266, 268-69. See also Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 616-17.
112 See PHSBPRA, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002). The law does not
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public disclosure of plant vulnerabilities or emergency response
plans.1 1
3
While transparency and public participation in expanded
emergency planning programs are important tools in reducing the
risk of harm to the environment or health caused by terrorist acts,
public disclosure of environmental and health risks outside of
emergency planning should continue to be a principal tool in
reducing such risks."4 Information disclosure has been a dominant
tool in environmental laws and programs over the past decade," 5
which governments should continue to rely on. At the same time,
they should maintain some minimal command and control
security requirements to address potential terrorist acts." 6
allow EPA to analyze information provided in vulnerability assessments, but
merely to verify that the assessments were submitted and that they meet
criteria established for content. See EPA Retains Lead in Protecting Utilities
UnderNew Homeland Security Directive, 35 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 21 (Jan. 2,2004).
113 See generally O'Reilly, supra note 90 (discussing the different approaches
states have taken to protect chemical plants from terrorists).
114 In some extreme cases, the disclosure of potential environmental and health
risks could significantly increase the probability that those risks will occur. In
those extreme cases, it may be prudent to withhold information regarding the
manner in which such risks could occur. However, when disclosure of potential
environmental and health risks does not significantly increase the probability
that those risks will occur, it seems appropriate to allow the communities that
will be directly impacted by those risks to play a significant role in preventing
them, instead of leaving the decision regarding the appropriate level of risk to
the government and the facilities that pose the risk.
115 According to a recent EPA report, toxic releases that must be reported under
EPCRA declined by 45.3% between 1988 and 1998. See STEPHEN M. JOHNSON,
ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 211 (2004). Similarly, as a result of
California's Proposition 65 labeling law for carcinogens, "[n]early forty
manufacturers of glazed ceramicware (china) have agreed to reduce lead levels
in their flatware by fifty percent and . . . [m] anufacturers have agreed to
reformulate dozens of automobile paints, coatings, adhesives and related
products." Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings
Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 341-42 (1996)
(citations omitted).
116 Market-based environmental programs have historically been used in the
United States "to supplement, rather than replace, command-and-control
programs." JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 125. Pollution trading programs and
pollution fees are usually imposed in addition to technology or health-based
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Public disclosure of environmental and health risks provides
clear benefits to governments, businesses, and the public. First,
when information disclosure requirements replace command and
control regimes, governments benefit because the information
collection requirements of command and control programs are
often time consuming and expensive." 7 In addition, because the
cost of information disclosure programs for the regulated commu-
nity is usually quite low, the programs can be "appl [ied] to a much
broader community than command-and-control programs.""'
Those benefits may not be realized in the context of laws to
reduce environmental or health risks from terrorist acts because
governments are unlikely to abandon command and control
security requirements as a tool to address those risks.
However, governments receive additional benefits from
information disclosure programs when they are coupled with
existing environmental command and control programs. As more
detailed information regarding environmental and health risks
is disclosed, the public can provide broader and more specific
comments to assist the government in environmental decision-
making. To the extent that the quality of information that
governments receive through public comment improves, their
ultimate decisions will be more rational and more likely to reduce
environmental and health risks." 9 By empowering communities
and local citizens, information disclosure laws promote democratic
decision-making and "promote individual and community auton-
omy in decisionmaking." 2 ° Information disclosure laws also
promote cooperative federalism because they bring regional and
pollution standards. Id. at 125-26. Similarly, information disclosure provisions
in environmental laws usually generate information that could be used in
enforcing command and control requirements of environmental laws. Id.
117 Id. at 214.
118 Id.
9 See Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing
Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the
Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 315 (1998) [hereinafter The Internet Changes
Everything].
120 See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure and the First
Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 657 (1993). See also JOHNSON, supra
note 115, at 211.
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local environmental problems to the attention of regional and
local authorities, and do not require national responses to
those problems.121
Information disclosure laws also provide clear benefits to the
public. Informed citizens have a variety of means at their disposal
to encourage businesses to reduce health and environmental risks
posed by their business activities. 22 First, consumers can encour-
age businesses to reduce dangerous activities by boycotting
products and services that increase risks.'2 3 Consumers can also
apply pressure to businesses by purchasing stock in companies
that reduce environmental and health risks to their communities
and selling their stock in companies that do not.'24 Citizens can
use the information received through information disclosure laws
to negotiate more directly the means of risk reduction with
businesses in their communities or to lobby legislators or govern-
ment agencies to enact risk-reducing regulations.'25
Finally, information disclosure provisions can play an impor-
tant role in reducing environmental injustice. Chemical plants and
businesses that release the greatest amount of pollution, according
to TRI, are disproportionately sited in low income and minority
121See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 214. Information disclosure requirements
also provide government regulators with information about high levels of risk
or "high incidences of legal violations that can be used . . . to identify en-
forcement priorities, regulatory development, or legislative initiatives." Id.
For instance, several provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments were
prompted by the disclosure of information under EPCRA. Id.
122 The laws facilitate market-based reductions in environmental and health
risks by reducing information deficits, a market failure. Id. at 209.
123 Id. at 210.
124 Id.
125 Id. See also Esty, supra note 44, at 54. Professor Esty argues that "easier
access to 'technical' information could facilitate the revival of a property-rights-
based environmental protection regime." Id. at 54. Even under the existing
regime, however, information disclosure requirements are empowering
communities to bargain for environmental and health risk reduction. Id. As
described below, public disclosure of information about the hazards created by
the storage of liquid chlorine at a wastewater treatment facility in Washington,
D.C. prompted community action that resulted in the substitution of safer
chemicals for chlorine. See Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 616.
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communities.'2 6 Because most of those facilities store, produce or
use hazardous chemicals, and many of them are located in densely
populated urban areas, the facilities could be prime targets of
terrorists. To the extent that information disclosure provisions
empower citizens and communities in the manner described above,
they thus reduce the risk of harm to the environment and health
in low income and minority communities. Furthermore, because
most environmental justice battles are won at the local, rather
than national level, 2 7 information disclosure provisions that
empower community activists and spur local decision-making
reduce the potential for environmental injustice by shifting the
battleground from the national to the local level.
Information disclosure laws provide benefits to businesses as
well. These laws are more efficient than command and control
laws because they allow businesses to determine the degree to
which they will reduce environment and health risks, instead of
following government-mandated levels. 2 ' The laws also increase
businesses' awareness of the risks imposed by their own activities
126 See, e.g., Andrew Szasz & Michael Meuser, Unintended, Inexorable: The
Production ofEnvironmental Inequalities in Santa Clara County, California, 43
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 602 (2000); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE, From Plantations to Plants: Report of the Emergency National
Commission on Environmental and Economic Justice in St. James Parish,
Louisiana 6-8 (Sept. 15, 1998), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20040310133238/www.ejrc.cau.edu/convent report.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2004); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of Environmental Risk:
The Case of TRI Facilities, 78 SoC. Sci. Q. 811 (1997); Andrew Szasz & Michael
Meuser, Environmental Inequalities: Literature Review and Proposals for New
Directions in Research and Theory, 45 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 99, 105-11 (1997);
EPA Region 11 Plans Full-Bore Assault on Problems in Specific Communities,
PESTICIDE & TOxIC CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 28, 1996.
12 7 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental
Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1998); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as
the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law,
19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 674-79 (1992).
128 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 212-13. Once again, however, this benefit is
likely to be reduced in the context of laws to prevent risks from potential
terrorist acts because governments are unlikely to abandon some minimal
command and control security requirements.
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and allow them to compare those risks to those of their competi-
tors. "This is a hallmark of reflexive environmental law."129 As
businesses identify the risks posed by their activities and deter-
mine that the public may view those risks as unacceptable when
compared to the activities of their competitors, businesses will
voluntarily implement programs to reduce those risks.
Information disclosure laws and programs are only effective in
reducing environmental and health risks when the disclosed
information reaches persons who can use the information to force
businesses to reduce those risks. The Internet plays a vital role in
making that information accessible to communities that are at
risk from harm caused by terrorist acts. 3 ° The Internet allows
citizens to access and search vast quantities of data at a low cost
and coordinate community efforts to reduce risks posed by faci-
lities.'3 ' It also increases opportunities for public participation,
thus democratizing government decision-making. 132 Although the
Internet increases community awareness and the potential for risk
prevention, it could also increase terrorist awareness and potential
for terrorists' exploitation of those risks. In light of such concerns,
governments have reduced disclosure of information on the
Internet, preferring to make the data available in reading rooms
of regional government offices, or to make summaries of the data,
rather than the raw data, available. 133 These alternative methods
of information disclosure have, however, limited public access to
129Id. at 212; See Esty, supra note 44, at 9; Bradley Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 261 (2001).
"0 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 226-27. See also Esty, supra note 44, at 48-
50.
131 See Esty, supra note 44, at 48-50.
132 Id. "If the Internet is the primary vehicle for delivery of information,"
however, "the digital divide between the technology 'haves' and 'have nots' could
further marginalize poor communities." JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 223
(referencing The Internet Changes Everything, supra note 119, at 305-10). But,
this concern is reduced by the manner in which information is a public good;
only a small group of motivated persons actually needs to use the information
provided through information disclosure programs to reduce environmental and
health risks for entire communities or large segments of the public. Id. See also
Rechtschaffen, supra note 115, at 318.133 See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 29:107
important risk information and have limited the effectiveness of
information disclosure programs.' Furthermore, in many cases,
the information that governments have sought to remove from the
Internet is accessible to terrorists in a variety of other forms.'35
Therefore, unless Internet disclosure of information regarding
environmental and health risks would significantly increase the
likelihood that terrorists will access and use the information,
governments should continue to use the Internet to make this
important risk information available to the public.
Despite all of the benefits discussed above, information
disclosure laws and programs have generally been criticized on
several grounds. The most common criticism is that information
provided through the laws can be incomplete, inaccurate, and
confusing.'3 6 Because information "disclosure laws are designed to
134 EPA and DOJ conducted a cost-benefit analysis to determine how to make
information from the Clean Air Act's Risk Management Program available to the
public. The agencies noted that the public was at least 250 times more likely to
access toxic release data under EPCRA on the Internet than to obtain it from
local emergency planning committees. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 360.
135 See id. at 364. The information that EPA removed from its Web site regarding
offsite consequences analyses under the Clean Air Act's Risk Management
Program is available on RTK. NET, an Internet database provided by a public
interest group that focuses on government accountability. See OMB Watch,
RTK Net: The Right-to-Know Network, at http://www.rtknet. org/ (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004). As Joseph Siegel notes,
[e]ven a terrorist lacking resources and expertise could easily
search for the location of chemical facilities in trade journals, on
the Internet, and even in the local telephone book. Indeed, a
road trip down many of our Nation's highways is all that would
be necessary to identify some industrial targets. Only a mini-
mum amount of knowledge would be necessary to understand
which processes would be likely to produce the most devastating
effects if compromised.
Siegel, supra note 10, at 365.
136 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 214. William Pedersen describes the problem
in the context of the toxic release inventory under EPCRA as follows:
TRI fails to inform the public the true extent of either toxic re-
leases or the toxic risks that they face .... According to an early,
imperfect estimate, the sources covered by the legislative TRI
specifications account for less than five percent of the environ-
mental releases of the legislatively listed chemicals. . .. TRI is
138
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remedy market failures caused by incomplete information", the
"market will continue to be an inefficient mechanism" to reduce
risks if the "information provided through [disclosure programs is]
incomplete, inaccurate, or confusing."'3 7 Information disclosure
laws and programs are also frequently criticized because the public
has limited capacity to process and understand the information
they provide. 13 Even if information provided through information
intended to give the public a full picture of releases of
environmentally hazardous chemicals.... From a wholesale
perspective, however, TRI covers only a fraction of chemicals.
Moreover, EPA has been unable to extend TRI coverage to the
hazardous substances released in the greatest quantities....
TRI by itself provides nothing more than a quantitative list of
various chemical releases. Even if that list included all releases
of all chemicals above some designated hazard level, it would
not accurately inform communities of the risks those releases
pose.... In the absence of characterization, TRI may mislead
its users. Simple reporting of the number of pounds of "toxic
chemicals" released conveys an implicit message that the
total presents a significant risk--otherwise why would it be
reported at all?
William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes
and Beyond, 25 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 164-72 (2001) (footnotes omitted). In
addition, Professor Daniel Esty notes that "[1] ower cost information access may
mean more disinformation circulates through the policymaking process....
[T]he shift towards a digitized world ... may increase the opportunities for
special interest manipulation of the policy process as well as the risk of
public distraction and citizen disengagement from policymaking." See Esty,
supra note 44, at 4.
137 JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 214.
138 Id. at 219; see also Esty, supra note 44, at 30-32; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 337-39 (1997). Professor Sunstein elaborates on
these criticisms as follows:
1. Information-processing. People have limited ability to process
information . . . .They have a notoriously difficult time in
thinking about low-probability events. Sometimes they
discount such events to zero; sometimes they treat them as
much more dangerous than they actually are.... 2. Heuristics.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that people tend to use
heuristic devices that produce systemic errors .... There is a
good deal of evidence that people overestimate risks from highly
visible or sensational causes, but underestimate risks from less
dramatic ones .... 3. Motivational distortions. People often
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disclosure laws and programs is accurate, complete, and under-
standable, the public thus may not use the information effectively.
Finally, critics point out that information disclosure laws and
programs will not be effective if citizens are unwilling to incur the
cost of discovering information, prefer to free ride on the efforts of
others, and those others do not take the initiative to discover and
use the information to force businesses to reduce risks.'39
While those concerns are valid criticisms of information
disclosure programs in general, they may be less problematic in
the context of information disclosure programs designed to reduce
environmental and health risks caused by terrorist acts. First, it
is unlikely that citizens will be unwilling to incur the relatively
low cost of discovering information about risks caused by terrorist
acts, because the events of September 11 have increased the pub-
lic's perception of the likelihood and magnitude of such risks. 40
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the information will be confusing
or that the volume of information will overwhelm the public's
capacity to comprehend it. While much of the information that
agencies evaluate in making environmental policy decisions is in
fact confusing or overwhelming, information regarding the
environmental or health risks of terrorist acts should be much
more straightforward. Instead of focusing on whether exposure to
believe themselves to be immune from risks that they ack-
nowledge are significant and real with respect to others....
4. Dissonance reduction. The desire to reduce cognitive
dissonance may prevent people from recognizing that risks are
real even when information is provided.... 5. Frustration from
uncertainty. Often people feel frustrated greatly prefer a
certain answer.... 6. Overload. People face a pervasive risk
of information overload, causing consumers to treat a large
amount of information as equivalent to no information at
all.... 7. Tenacity of initial beliefs. Initially held beliefs are not
easy to modify. This is so even when new information,
undermining those beliefs, has been presented.
Id.
139 JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 222-24.
140 Businesses, on the other hand, may have a greater incentive to avoid
disclosing this information than they would have to avoid disclosing many other
types of information.
140
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a specific level of a pollutant in the air over twenty years will
increase the potential for lung cancer by 0.01%, citizens might be
focusing on whether additional security guards or a change in a
business's process might prevent a leak in a chemical storage tank.
Criticism should thus not prevent governments from expanding
emergency planning requirements of environmental laws and
utilizing information disclosure to reduce the environmental and
health risks of terrorist acts.
IV. POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICs USE REDUCTION
Although emergency planning requirements and information
disclosure requirements are important tools to reduce the poten-
tial environmental and health risks of terrorist acts, stronger
pollution prevention legislation, with a specific focus on toxics use
reduction, should be a primary component of government programs
to reduce those risks. In 1990, Congress enacted the Pollution
Prevention Act ("PPA")'4 ' to encourage businesses to voluntarily
adopt pollution prevention practices. Congress rejected the
concept of mandatory pollution prevention standards and most
other mandatory pollution prevention requirements when it
enacted the law. '42 Congress felt that businesses would voluntarily
adopt pollution prevention practices if they were aware of the
economic benefits of those practices.'43 Unfortunately, the law has
not stimulated a revolution in pollution prevention. In response to
the September 11 attacks, there has been a renewed push in
Congress to adopt mandatory pollution prevention standards.
Many legislators recognize that the environmental and health
risks posed by terrorist acts are reduced significantly when
businesses reduce their production, use, or storage of hazardous
and toxic chemicals. While it is unlikely that Congress will adopt
mandatory pollution prevention standards, the events of Septem-
141 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000).
142 See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution
Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 159 (1992) [hereinafter From Rea-
ction to Proaction].
143 Id.
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ber 11 should be the impetus for more moderate amendments to
PPA, with special emphasis on toxics use reduction. Specifically,
Congress should require mandatory pollution prevention planning,
broader and more detailed reporting and disclosure of pollution
prevention activities, and increased financial assistance for
pollution prevention activities.
Pollution prevention has several clear benefits for industry,
government, and the public. For businesses, pollution prevention
provides substantial economic benefits.'" The cost of controlling
pollution after it has been generated has increased dramatically
over the past few decades, and businesses recognize that pollution
prevention is significantly less expensive than pollution control.
Pollution control costs for businesses have increased as govern-
ments have imposed broad command and control requirements
on polluters. 145 Potential liability for harm to the environment
and health caused by pollution has also increased, providing
additional stimulus for pollution prevention by businesses. 14
Businesses are also increasingly adopting pollution prevention
practices in order to maintain or improve their reputation among
consumers, who are examining the environmental practices of
businesses more closely when making purchasing choices.'47
144 Id. Economic benefits are often cited as the primary pollution prevention in-
centive for businesses. Chevron's pollution prevention program saved the comp-
any$3.8 million in a single year, while 3M's totaled more than $300 million over
tenyears. Id. at 162 n. 44. ADow Chemical study found that companies receive a
fifty percent return on their investments in pollution prevention programs,
compared to a thirteen percent return on investment in technologies for pollu-
tion control compliance. See Kurt A. Strasser, Preventing Pollution, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
145 See From Reaction to Proaction, supra note 142, at 159. The cost of the
technologies required to comply with the pollution control requirements,
and the administrative cost of complying with the requirements, has increased
significantly as the requirements have increased. Id.146 Id. at 160. Businesses' concerns regarding liability have increased as pollution
insurance has become more expensive, if it is even available. Id.
147 Id. Pollution prevention operates as both a sword and a shield for businesses.
It enhances a company's environmental reputation, bolstering marketing efforts,
and also deflects public scorn and retaliation that would exist if the company
emitted excessive amounts of pollution. Id.
142
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Pollution prevention practices also generate economic benefits by
increasing the efficiency of industrial processes." Finally,
businesses can reduce their appeal as terrorist targets and the
magnitude of harm to the environment and health if an attack
were to occur by reducing the toxicity of chemicals that they
produce, use, or store. September 11 should provide significant
motivation for businesses to employ pollution prevention practices.
While economic factors generally encourage businesses to
explore and implement pollution prevention opportunities, the
public supports pollution prevention because it generally reduces:
"(1) the amount of toxic substances present in the environment;
(2) worker exposure to toxic substances; (3) the potential for
accidents and spills in transporting toxic substances; and (4) the
amount of toxic substances present in consumer products."'49 After
September 11, the reduced potential for terrorist acts at a facility
is also a clear benefit of pollution prevention practices for con-
sumers as well as businesses.
Governments generally support pollution prevention practices
because they can provide greater environmental protection than
command and control requirements and can reduce government
expenses for implementing regulatory pollution control
programs. 5 ' Because pollution prevention can result in increased
industrial efficiency, it can also prompt increased tax revenue for
governments.' 5 ' Finally, the reduced potential for terrorist acts and
the reduced magnitude of harm to the environment and health
caused by terrorist acts are clear benefits for government, as well
as for businesses and the public.
Although pollution prevention provides benefits to businesses,
government, and the public, many businesses have not imple-
mented pollution prevention practices. When Congress enacted
PPA in 1990, legislators assumed that businesses were not
adopting pollution prevention because they were not aware of the
opportunities that existed, or they were not aware of the cost
14' From Reaction to Proaction, supra note 142, at 161.
149 Id. at 162.
150 Id. at 163.
151 Id.
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savings provided by those opportunities.152 Legislators also
assumed that once businesses became aware of the opportunities
and the cost savings, they would implement pollution prevention
voluntarily.153 PPA thus includes several provisions to spur
voluntary pollution prevention, but few mandatory requirements.
Specifically, the law requires EPA to create an information
clearinghouse to provide businesses with information regarding
pollution prevention opportunities.' It also creates a grant
program to enable businesses to implement pollution prevention
practices. 5 5 The law further focuses on promoting pollution
prevention generally, 56 while many state laws instead focus on
promoting toxics use reduction, a narrower category of pollution
prevention. 5 7 While the toxics use reduction focus of some state
laws is narrower than PPA, after September 11 it is clear that
more pollution prevention efforts should be targeted at toxics use
152 From Reaction to Proaction, supra note 142, at 183.
153 Id.
154 42 U.S.C. § 13103(b)(5) (2000). Congress was also concerned that businesses
might not adopt pollution prevention practices because of the difficulty in
measuring pollution prevention. Accordingly, the law requires EPA to establish
standard methods of measuring source reduction. Id. § 13103(b)(1).
155 Id. § 13104. While pollution prevention technologies may save businesses
money over time, initial implementation of such technologies may often
require substantial financial investments. From Reaction to Proaction, supra
note 142, at 164.
156 PPA focuses on encouraging "source reduction," defined as
any practice which -
(i) reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise released
into the environment . . . prior to recycling, treatment, or
disposal, and
(ii) reduces the hazards to public health and the environment
associated with the release of such substances, pollutants, or
contaminants.
Id. § 13102(5)(A). Prior to the law, EPA's pollution prevention efforts focused
more broadly on "waste minimization," which includes practices designed to
eliminate the generation of waste or recycle or treat waste after it is produced.
From Reaction to Proaction, supra note 142, at 164.
157 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 2301-02 (West Supp. 1990); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, § 2 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.003(13) (2001).
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reduction, which would have the greatest impact on reducing the
potential for environmental and health risks caused by terrorist
acts.
The only significant mandatory requirement in PPA is a repor-
ting requirement."'5 Businesses that are required to submit toxic
release inventory data under EPCRA must include general
information about their pollution prevention practices.'59 EPA has
established numerous programs to encourage voluntary pollution
prevention, 160 including the 33/50 Initiative,'6 ' the WasteWise
158 42 U.S.C. § 13106 (2000).
"' Id. The law only requires businesses to identify, in very general categories,
the type of pollution prevention actions they have taken regarding the chemicals
for which reporting is required under EPCRA. Id.
160 EPA's Partners for the Environment program encompasses more than forty
voluntary programs that the agency has developed to improve environmental
compliance. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Partners for the Environment: About
Us, at http://www.epa.gov/partners/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
More than 11,000 companies have participated in those programs, and EPA
claims that the programs have saved participants $5.9 billion, 603 million
gallons of water, 768.8 trillion BTUs of energy, and have reduced emissions of
nitrogen oxides by 158,000 tons and sulfur dioxide by 288,000 tons. Id. The
increased adoption of pollution prevention practices parallels an increased
adoption, by businesses, of environmental management systems ("EMS"). These
systems include company-wide environmental policies, identifying the
environmental impacts of the company's actions (often through an
environmental audit), identifying targets and objectives to reduce negative
environmental impacts, and establishing tools to measure the company's
ability to meet those targets and objectives. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-01-283, EPA SHOULD STRENGTHEN ITS EFFORTS TO MEASURE AND EN-
COURAGE POLLUTION PREVENTION 31-32 (2001). Although EMS is not adopted to
promote pollution prevention, the reflexive nature of the EMS development
process creates an atmosphere in which pollution prevention often thrives.
161 See OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD (1999),
available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/index.html. The initiative was one
of the agency's earliest voluntary pollution prevention programs and was
implemented between 1992 and 1995. Id. Through the program, EPA identified
seventeen toxic chemicals and asked participating companies to voluntarily
reduce their emissions of those chemicals by 33% by 1992 and 50% by 1995. Id.
More than 1,200 companies, responsible for 62% of the emissions of the
chemicals covered by the program, participated in the program and reduced
their emissions by the targeted 50% a year before the 1995 deadline. See U.S.
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program,162  the water Alliances for Voluntary Efficiency
program, 63 the Energy Star programs,"M the Design for the
Environment program,'65 and the Environmental Accounting Pro-
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RECD-94-93, EPA NEEDS MORE RELIABLE
SOURCE REDUCTION DATA AND PROGRESS MEASURES (1994), available at
http://161.203.16.4/t2pbat2/152793.pdf; OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND
TOXICS, U.S. ENTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLLUTION PREVENTION 1997: A NATIONAL
PROGRESS REPORT 4 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/
p2_97/execsumm.pdf [hereinafterPOLLUTION PREVENTION 1997].
162 The WasteWise program is designed to encourage businesses to reduce solid
waste through prevention, reuse, or recycling. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency,
About WasteWise, at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/reduce/wstewise/
about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12,2004). More than 1,100 organizations had
participated in the program as of 2002. Through the program, companies
assess their waste generation, identify waste reduction goals, and measure and
report progress toward those goals. In 1998, program participants reduced waste
generation by 7.8 million tons and saved $280 million. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NAT. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA-240-R-01-O01, THE UNITED STATES
EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT §
10.2.4 (2001) [hereinafter NAT. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON.].
163 See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Water Use Efficiency Program, at http://www.
epa.gov/owm/water-efficiency/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
" The Energy Star Partnership Program is an energy conservation program for
homes, schools, businesses, and governments. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency,
Energy Star, at http://www.energystar.gov/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). By
1999, more than 5,500 organizations were participating in the Energy Star
Buildings Program, reducing energy use by more than 108 billion kilowatt
hours. See NAT. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., supra note 163, § 10.2.2.1. EPA and the
Department of Energy also sponsor an Energy Star Homes program. Builders
in the voluntary program construct homes that are thirty percent more energy
efficient than guidelines of the Model Energy Code, and the program
"encourages lenders to provide Energy-Efficient Mortgages, which offer lower
interest rates[,] .. . lower closing costs," and other benefits. Id. § 10.2.2.3.
165 See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Design for the Environment (DfE), at
http://www.epa.gov/dfe/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). As EPA suggests,
[tihe process systematically: Identifies the array of techno-
logies, products, and processes that can be used to perform a
particular function within an industry and related pollution
prevention opportunities. Evaluates and compares the risk,
performance, and cost tradeoffs of the alternatives. Disse-
minates this information to the entire industry community.
Encourages and enables use of this information by providing
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ject ("EAP"). 166 While those voluntary programs have prompted
many businesses to adopt pollution prevention practices, signifi-
cant opportunities for pollution prevention remain untapped.
Although the events of September 11 have not yet prompted
proposals to broaden federal pollution prevention efforts through
amendment of PPA, they have prompted legislators to consider
narrower legislation that encourages businesses to implement
inherently safer technologies.'6 7 Implementation of inherently
safer technologies would provide many of the same benefits to
businesses, government, and the public as pollution prevention. A
business could implement inherently safer technologies by using
fewer hazardous chemicals in its production process, using less
hazardous chemicals, or using chemicals in a less hazardous
mechanisms and incentives to institutionalize continuous
environmental improvement.
U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, About DfE, at http://www.epa.gov/dfe/about/index.
htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
166 The project, initiated in 1992, encourages businesses to understand the full
environmental costs of their actions, and to integrate those costs into their
decision-making. The National Center for Environmental Economics described
the project as follows:
The EAP encourages businesses to focus on energy costs, capital
and operating costs of equipment that controls pollution,
remediation efforts, salaries of environmental managers, public
relations outlays, and other costs associated with the en-
vironment. Closer tracking of these costs enables businesses to
identify opportunities to reduce or eliminate various elements
of these costs. Companies can improve their environmental
performance, gain a competitive advantage, and achieve cost
savings or increased revenues. EPA maintains a network of over
800 members of the EAP who share information and ideas. EAP
has prepared several guidebooks for implementing these
concepts, and it has developed a number of case studies that
illustrate the gains that can be achieved.
NAT. CTR. FORENVTL. ECON., supra note 162, § 10.3.3. EPA currently works with
the Tellus Institute to maintain and develop further information on envi-
ronmental accounting. See EMARIC, Environmental Management Accounting
International Website, at http://www.emawebsite.org (last visited Sept. 12,2004).
167 See infra notes 178-184 and accompanying text.
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manner. 6 ' To the extent that the new processes are safer, they
will reduce the risk of harm to health and the environment posed
by business activities and benefitting the public, governments, and
the business.'69 While the implementation of inherently safer
technologies reduces businesses' potential liability for harm, it
may also reduce their production costs if the shift to an inherently
safer technology reduces the regulatory controls imposed on the
production process by government environmental agencies. 7 ' As
168 Many process or materials changes are relatively easy and inexpensive.
Kenneth Geiser notes that "[diecreasing the amounts of hazardous chemicals
stored onsite through just-in-time delivery is fairly cost-effective .... On-site
generation of chemical intermediates has reduced the need to transport and
store such substances. Substituting chemicals is often the most direct route to
risk reduction." Kenneth Geiser, Primary Measures Safer, Cheaper, Better,
ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 49.
169 Inherent safety measures reduce the likelihood of fire and explosions at
facilities, minimize the creation of toxic or hazardous waste products, reduce or
eliminate workplace hazards, produce safer products, and can reduce the need
to transport hazardous chemicals. Id. at 49. For instance, a report of the
Environmental Defense Fund noted that wastewater treatment plants that use
chlorine as a disinfectant pose risks to nineteen million Americans. See CAROL
ANDRESS, ELIMINATING HOMETOWN HAZARDS: CUTTING CHEMICAL RISKS AT
WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES 3 (2003), available at http://www.fcan.
orgfPress/wastewater_04.pdf. However, as many plants have already done, those
plants could replace chlorine with sodium hypochlorite or ultraviolet light and
significantly reduce the environmental and health risks posed to communities.
Id. at 4-7. Since 1999, twelve wastewater plants, including the primary sewage
treatment plant for Washington, D.C., replaced chlorine in their processes with
inherently safer alternatives. See Rick Hind, Chemical Safety Cannot Be
Optional, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 50-51. Companies have found ways
to reduce the use of chlorine in other processes as well. In 2001, Cargill-Dow
began using vegetable matter, instead of chlorine, in a new plastic
manufacturing plant. Id. Many paper mills have eliminated chlorine from their
bleaching processes, and EPA and the military have developed, and are
promoting, chlorine-free solvents for use in other chemical processes. Id. at 51.
While many of these reductions have been achieved through voluntary
measures, New Jersey's Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act has prompted most
of the water treatment facilities in the state to eliminate or reduce the use of
chlorine. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 380-81.170 See Stephen R. Dujack, Should Government Mandate Safer Technologies for
the Chemical Industry?, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 46.
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noted earlier, the public also receives clear benefits because
inherently safer technologies can eliminate the risk of harm to the
environment and health caused by terrorist acts, whereas govern-
ment efforts to harden targets of potential terrorist activity can
only reduce, and rarely eliminate, the risks to the public.' 7'
Businesses have examined and implemented inherently safer
technologies voluntarily for several decades, just as they have
implemented pollution prevention voluntarily.'72 However, just as
businesses have opposed mandatory pollution prevention require-
ments, they have lobbied heavily against legislation or government
programs that would require the use of inherently safer technolo-
gies.173 Industries argue that governments will never have the
171 See Geiser, supra note 168, at 49. "The Coast Guard's National Response
Center has identified over 3,000 major chemical accidents at industrial facilities
over the past 15 years." Id. After September 11, the potential for accidents at
industrial facilities is greater, and even the most drastic measures to harden
potential targets of terrorism may be ineffective against aircraft or missile
attack. Id. See also Hind, supra note 169, at 50. Shortly after the September 11
attacks, 400 pounds of methyl bromide were stolen from a chemical wholesale
warehouse in Florida, despite voluntary measures implemented by the
warehouse to increase security in response to the attacks. See Siegel, supra note
10, at 368-69. The Naval Research Laboratory has estimated that more than
100,000 people could be at risk within the first thirty minutes of an attack or
accident involving industrial chemicals. See Hind, supra note 169, at 50. Because
more than 85% of the country's critical infrastructure is owned and managed by
the private sector, the public currently relies heavily on voluntary decisions by
businesses regarding the utility or efficiency of hardening targets against
terrorism. See Robert P. Licouski, DHS is not Waiting for Legislation, ENVTL.
FORUM, Jan/Feb. 2004, at 53.
17 2 See Geiser, supra note 168, at 49; Marty Durbin, Inherent Safety Doesn't Lend
to Gov't. Mandate, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan/Feb. 2004, at 48. The American
Chemistry Council has encouraged business to adopt inherently safer
technologies as part of its Responsible Care program for more than a decade.
See American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care, Practitioner's Site at
http://www.americanchemistry.com/rc.nsf/secondaryprofilesid/lsgs-4dnmdz?
opendocument (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
173 See Durbin, supra note 172, at 48. After September 11, the American
Chemistry Council drafted a Responsible Care Security Code requiring
"members [of the Council] to develop and implement security measures . . .
taking into account inherently safer approaches to process design." Id. However,
the Code is a voluntary industry initiative and not a binding government
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expertise to identify appropriate technologies and that the
mandatory requirements will stifle innovation or interfere with
industrial productivity.'74 Businesses argue that they should be
allowed to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
the cost of adopting alternative technologies is justified by the
environmental, health, and security risks posed by failure to adopt
the alternative technologies. 175 Critics of mandatory inherent
safety requirements point out that many inherent safety ap-
proaches reduce some risks but increase others.'76 Mandatory
requirements can thus have unintended consequences for govern-
ment regulators.'77 Critics are raising these concerns as Congress
considers two bills that take very different approaches toward
inherent safety requirements.
The Chemical Security Act ("CSA"), 178 introduced in 2001 and
reintroduced in 2003 by Senator John Corzine of New Jersey,
would require EPA to identify categories of chemical sources that
might be priority targets of terrorist acts. 179 Businesses in those
categories would be required to prepare vulnerability assessments
mandate. Id. Several other industry associations have also developed security
guidelines for their members. See AM. Soc'Y OF SAFETY ENG'RS, PROVIDING
SECURE TRUCK OPERATIONS: SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMMERCIAL
VEHICLE OPERATOR (2002); ASS'N OF METRO. SEWERAGE AGENCIES, PRO-
TECTING WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS: LEGAL ISSUES IN A TIME OF
CRISIS CHECKLIST (2002), available at http://www.amsa-cleanwater.org/private/
legalalerts/leg02.2.cfm.
'
74 See James M. Inhofe, Complex Risks: Best Judged By The Industry, ENVTL.
FORUM JaniFeb. 2004, at 52. See also Durbin, supra note 172, at 49; Hind,
supra note 169, at 51.171 See Durbin, supra note 172, at 48.
176 For instance, Marty Durbin, security team leader for the American Chemistry
Council, notes that "[bl y reducing [onsite] inventories [of hazardous chemicals]
... a facility may increase the number of truck shipments through the plant's
neighborhood. Similarly, replacing a low temperature, low pressure process that
uses a toxic chemical with a process that uses a less toxic chemical, but operates
at higher temperatures and pressure, could endanger workers." Id.
177 Durbin argues that chlorofluorocarbons, underground storage tanks, and
PCBs were all originally seen as inherently safer materials than the materials
they replaced because they reduced the risk of fire or explosions. Id. at 49.
178 S. 157, 108th Cong. (2003).
179 Id. § 4(a).
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and to prepare prevention, preparedness, and emergency response
plans.' ° The plans would include "actions and procedures, in-
cluding safer design and maintenance of the chemical source, to
eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of an
unauthorized release" of chemicals regulated by the law.' While
the information in the plans would be exempt from disclosure
under FOIA, s2 companies would be required to provide the plans
and assessments to EPA," 3 and the agency could review the plans
and order companies to implement measures in the plans.
8 4
The Chemical Facilities Security Act, ("CFSA") 8 5 introduced
by Senators Zell Miller of Georgia and James Inhofe of Oklahoma,
takes a fundamentally different approach to the environmental
'
8oId. § 4(a)(3).
181 Id. § 4(a)(3)(B). The legislation would define "use of an inherently safer
technology" as
use of a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as
compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or
practices currently in use-
(i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a release of a
substance of concern from the chemical source prior to
secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and
(ii) reduces or eliminates the threats to public health and the
environment associated with a release or potential release of a
substance of concern from the chemical source.
(B) INCLUSIONS.- The term "use of inherently safer technology"
includes input substitution, catalyst or carrier substitution,
process redesign (including reuse or recycling of a substance of
concern), product reformulation, procedure simplification, and
technology modification so as to -
(i) use less hazardous substances or benign substances; (ii) use
a smaller quantity of covered substances of concern; (iii) reduce
hazardous pressures or temperatures; (iv) reduce the possibility
and potential consequences of equipment failure and human
error; (v) improve inventory control and chemical use efficiency;
and (vi) reduce or eliminate storage, transportation, handling,
disposal, and discharge of substances of concern.
Id. §3 (11).
182 Id. § 4(b)(4).
18' Chemical Security Act, S. 157, 108th Cong. § 4(b) (2003).
184 Id. § 5.
186 S. 994, 108th Cong. (2003).
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and health risks posed by terrorist acts. Although the bill would
also require businesses in priority industrial, it would require site
security plans, rather than prevention, preparedness, and emer-
gency response plans." 6 The security plans would focus on security
measures to harden the targets of potential terrorist acts, rather
than on process changes or implementation of inherently safer
technology, that could reduce the ultimate risks of harm to the
environment or health.8 7 In addition, businesses would not be
required to disclose the assessments and plans to the government
unless requested to do so.' In light of industry's strong opposition
to mandatory inherent safety requirements, it is likely that CFSA
has a much better chance of passage than CSA.
Between the mandatory inherent safety requirements of CSA,
and the laissez-faire approach to inherent safety adopted by
CFSA, there is a middle ground that could vastly reduce, in an
economically efficient manner, the potential environmental and
health risks of terrorist acts. Instead of battling over whether
inherent safety requirements should be imposed by government,
Congress should amend PPA to address weaknesses in the law
that have limited its effectiveness in prompting businesses to
adopt pollution prevention practices. First, additional funds could
be provided for pollution prevention grant and loan programs,189
186 ld. § 4.
187 Id. § 4(a)(3).
188Id. § 4(a)(1)(c).
's EPA's Office of Pollution Prevention sponsors a Pollution Prevention Grant
Program, a Pollution Prevention Information Network Grant Competition, and
a Source Reduction Grant Program. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, P2 Grants, at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/p2home/grants/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12,2004).
While the Office sponsored an Environmental Justice Through Pollution
Prevention Grant Program in the past, it has not funded the program since
2001. See U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Environmental Justice Through Pollution
Prevention Program, at http:/! www.epa.gov/opptintr/ejp2/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2004). The agency has also supported pollution prevention through several
other grant programs, including: the National Industrial Competitiveness
through Efficiency: Energy, Environment and Economics ("NICE3") program,
the Agriculture in Concert with the Environment ("ACE") program, the
Risk Reduction Through Pollution Prevention ("R2P2") program, the Municipal
Water Pollution Prevention ("MWPP") grant program, and media-specific pro-
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and the programs could be reformed to ensure that the funds assist
businesses in adopting pollution prevention programs and that
information regarding the funded programs is shared with other
businesses. 9 ' While EPA relies on general appropriations to fund
the federal pollution prevention grant and loan programs, funding
has been consistently inadequate to promote broad pollution
prevention.' 9 ' Many states impose fees or taxes on toxics use,
waste generation, or releases of toxic pollutants to fund pollution
prevention programs instead of relying on general appropriations,
grams. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLLUTION PREVENTION INCENTIVES FOR
STATES (PPIS) GRANT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT STUDY, EPA742-R-96-006 8 (1996)
[hereinafter POLLUTION PREVENTION INCENTIVES].
190 See Geiser, supra note 168, at 50. The cost of pollution prevention has been
a significant impediment for many businesses. See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at
16-17. In 1994, the General Accounting Office criticized EPA's program for
providing pollution prevention grants to states on the grounds that many of the
initiatives funded by the program did not involve pollution prevention, and
many of the state proposals did not demonstrate that the state programs would
become self-sufficient without EPA funding. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/PEMD-94-8, EPA SHOULD REEXAMINE THE OBJECTIVES AND SUSTAIN-
ABILITY OF STATE PROGRAMS 3 (1994). EPA has addressed many of these
concerns, but has found it difficult to measure the effectiveness of the state
grant program. See POLLUTION PREVENTION INCENTIVES, supra note 189, at 29-
30. In traditional grant programs for environmental permitting and enforce-
ment, EPA evaluates the effectiveness of the program by examining the number
of permits issued, inspections conducted, or enforcement actions commenced. Id.
at 30. This approach does not work for pollution prevention programs, although
some states attempt to measure the effectiveness of their pollution prevention
programs by counting the number of assessments conducted, the number of
people who attend workshops, and the number of people who use
clearinghouses. Id. at 29-30. Some states measure the effectiveness of their
programs by conducting follow-up visits, interviews or surveys of businesses that
receive pollution prevention assistance to determine their satisfaction, the rate
at which they are implementing government recommendations, and the amount
of pollution prevention achieved by those businesses. Id. at 34. However, it is
time consuming and expensive to conduct that level of evaluation, and many
businesses are reluctant to provide information to governments regarding which
pollution prevention measures were implemented and the success of those
measures. Id. at 35.
191 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 17-18.
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and it may be appropriate for Congress to consider adopting
similar funding mechanisms for pollution prevention grant and
loan programs.
19 2
Taxes or fees could be used to discourage the use or release of
toxics or the generation of wastes, but could also be used to
encourage pollution prevention. Congress could achieve that goal
by broadening the tax incentives available for pollution prevention
activities or pollution prevention planning.
Congress could also amend PPA to include additional manda-
tory pollution prevention provisions, instead of relying primarily
on voluntary actions by businesses. While mandatory pollution
prevention performance standards or throughput requirements are
undesirable for the same reasons that mandatory inherent safety
requirements are undesirable,'9 3 PPA should be amended to
provide for mandatory planning requirements and additional
reporting requirements. The benefits of planning and reporting
requirements in reducing environmental and health risks were
outlined above.
Many states have adopted laws or programs that require
mandatory pollution prevention planning.'94 Supporters of such
programs argue that mandatory planning forces businesses to
examine pollution prevention opportunities and their economic
benefits, which the businesses might not have considered if they
192 Id. at 17-18, 39-44.
"'
9 3 See Strasser, supra note 144, at 35-40; From Reaction to Proaction, supra note
143, at 184-85. Furthermore, establishment of mandatory pollution prevention
standards would be very expensive and time consuming for the government. See
JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 352-55.
194 By 1997, thirty states had adopted pollution prevention planning require-
ments. See POLLUTION PREVENTION 1997, supra note 161, at 7. Since PPA was
enacted, Congress has considered, but rejected, several legislative proposals to
require mandatory pollution prevention planning. See, e.g., Clean Water
Enforcement and Compliance Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1624, 108th
Cong. (2003); Right-to-Know-More and Pollution Prevention Act of 1997, S.
769, 105th Cong. (1997); Hazardous Pollution Prevention Planning Act of 1993,
S. 980, 103d Cong. (1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amend-
ments of 1991, S. 976, 102d Cong. (1991); Hazardous Pollution Prevention
Planning Act of 1991, S. 761, 102d Cong. (1991).
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were not required to prepare a plan.9 ' As with planning laws like
NEPA, supporters of pollution prevention planning requirements
envision that once businesses identify available pollution preven-
tion opportunities and understand their economic benefits, they
will adopt pollution prevention measures even though they are
not required to do so by law.'96 If Congress were to require
businesses to prepare pollution prevention plans, it would have to
address several important issues that states have encountered
when implementing mandatory planning programs. Specifically,
Congress would have to determine whether plans should be
reviewed and approved by the government, whether the govern-
ment can require businesses to implement measures identified in
their plans, and whether the information in the plans should be
disclosed to the public.197 Most states allow businesses to main-
tain their plans at their place of business, but also allow the
government to review and approve or disapprove of the plans. 9 '
With regard to enforcement, there are obvious problems created
by allowing the government to require businesses to implement
their plans, refusing to allow the government to mandate the
implementation of plans, or by forbidding such mandates. As has
been apparent in state programs, to the extent that pollution
prevention plans are enforceable, businesses have an incentive to
avoid stringent pollution prevention measures and to adopt modest
pollution prevention opportunities in their plan. On the other
hand, if pollution prevention plans were not enforceable, busi-
nesses might adopt more aggressive pollution prevention mea-
195 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 354-55.
'
9 6Id. Critics of mandatory planning assert that "planning requirements can be
expensive, c[an] divert resources from implementation of pollution prevention,
and c[an] create hostility in businesses toward pollution prevention." Id. at 355.
197 In addition, Congress would have to determine which substances would be
covered by planning requirements and which businesses would be required to
prepare plans.
198 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 25244.21 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 211, § 11 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115D.07 (West 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 465.018 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-304 (2001); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.95C.220 (West 2002).
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sures in their plans. However, there is no guarantee that the
measures would ever be implemented.
Congress should also increase PPA's mandatory reporting
requirements, which are currently minimal. The law merely re-
quires businesses that submit toxic chemical release forms under
EPCRA to state the amount of chemicals covered by the law that
they recycle, treat, release, or use for energy recovery. 99 Busi-
nesses that do not have to submit toxic chemical release forms do
not have any pollution prevention reporting requirements, and
businesses that are required to submit toxic chemical release
forms are not required to provide any information regarding
chemicals other than those covered by EPCRA. Furthermore, the
pollution prevention information that businesses are required to
submit, when they are required to do so, is minimal. Businesses
do not have to describe the specific actions that they are taking to
prevent pollution. Instead, they need only identify the type of
actions that they are taking as within one of four broad
categories.20 PPA should be amended to address those limitations.
Specifically, the scope of pollutants for which reporting is required
should be expanded, and pollution prevention activities should be
described more specifically in reporting, "on a process-specific
basis, rather than a facility-wide basis."2 ' These amendments
would provide EPA and state governments with broader informa-
tion regarding available pollution prevention opportunities and
their economic value. The government should disseminate that
information through clearinghouses and compliance assistance
programs to promote pollution prevention.2"2 Broader pollution
199 42 U.S.C. § 13106(b) (2000).
2
°° The four categories are: (1) equipment, technology, process or procedure
modifications; (2) reformulation or redesign of products; (3) substitution of raw
materials; and (4) improvement in management, training, inventory control,
materials handling, or other general operational phases. Id.
201 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 356. While more than "70,000 chemicals are
used commercially in the United States,. . . only 700 chemicals" are subject to
reporting under EPCRA and PPA. Id.20 21 d. In addition, the government needs to rely more heavily on the Internet as
a tool to collect and disseminate pollution prevention information. Professor
Daniel Esty describes the power of the Internet as a tool to facilitate recycling
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prevention reporting would also provide governments with more
accurate data regarding the success or failure of available pollu-
tion prevention measures. Finally, broader reporting would also
force "businesses [to be] more accountable for implementing
pollution prevention techniques and measures and achieving
actual reduction [of] pollution generation."20 3
CONCLUSION
These modest amendments to PPA should stimulate signifi-
cant pollution prevention. More importantly, however, by adopting
the amendments, Congress would acknowledge that the command
and control approach adopted by governments in response to
September 11 is ultimately flawed. Mandatory security require-
ments to harden businesses and critical infrastructure targets will
never eliminate the environmental and health risks posed by those
targets. Toxics use reduction measures could be much more effect-
ive, and, in many cases, less costly than mandatory security requir-
ements. While the events of September 11 fundamentally changed
our country in many ways, many things remain the same.
Governments were increasingly relying on pollution prevention,
information disclosure, and emergency and environmental plan-
as follows:
The market-making capacity at the Internet has various
environmental applications. Most notably, more "waste" can be
re-used and recycled. The re-use opportunity emerges where one
company's waste or by-products serve as another's raw material.
Historically the cost to the waste generator of finding a
synergistic partner would often have been unduly high. As a
result, byproducts were discarded. With the Internet, match-
making costs go down dramatically. In fact, Internet-driven re-
use/recycling relationships are multiplying at a very rapid pace.
Esty, supra note 44, at 53 (footnotes omitted).
20' Congress has been reluctant to broaden the reporting requirements of the
Pollution Prevention Act because businesses have asserted that the additional
reporting requirements would be expensive and time consuming, and could
require the "disclosure of confidential information or trade secrets." JOHNSON
supra note 115, at 357.
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ning programs to reduce environmental and health risks prior to
September 11. Those programs still have the same advantages
over command and control regulation today that they had on
September 10, 2001. While some mandatory security require-
ments are necessary, governments should shift their focus back
toward the programs that were proving to be successful prior to
September 11 and should not ignore the lessons learned in
environmental regulation in the last decade.
